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Many politicians manipulate information to prevent voters from
holding them accountable; however, mobile text messages may
make it easier for nongovernmental organizations to credibly
share information on official corruption that is difficult for politi-
cians to counter directly. We test the potential for texts on budget
management to improve democratic accountability by conducting
a large (n = 16,083) randomized controlled trial during the 2016
Ugandan district elections. In cooperation with a local partner,
we compiled, simplified, and text-messaged official information
on irregularities in local government budgets. Verified recipients
of messages that described more irregularities than expected
reported voting for incumbent councillors 6% less often; veri-
fied recipients of messages conveying fewer irregularities than
expected reported voting for incumbent councillors 5% more
often. The messages had no observable effect on votes for incum-
bent council chairs, potentially due to voters’ greater reliance on
other sources of information for higher profile elections. These
mixed results suggest that text messages on budget corruption
help voters hold some politicians accountable in settings where
elections are not free and fair.
voting | accountability | elections | communication technology |
information
In many countries, voters lack the information they need toevaluate politician performance. Instead, they vote for their
coethnics or in response to patronage (1, 2). These dynamics
reduce incentives for politicians to provide public goods and
increase the propensity for corruption (3). International orga-
nizations and civil-society activists have spent billions of dollars
attempting to help voters make better informed choices and
to encourage politicians to improve services (4–6). However,
many studies have questioned whether new political informa-
tion enables voters to hold politicians accountable in practice
(7–11). The mixed evidence is especially apparent in contexts
where politicians can manipulate or censor information about
performance by muzzling the press, repressing civil society, or
spinning public disclosures (12–14).
Messages on budget corruption sent via SMS text may be
harder for politicians to control and easier for nongovernmental
organizations to use. Although politicians can shut down tele-
phone networks or the Internet, this can prove costly, even in
repressive settings (15). Information on budget management by
SMS can also be tailored to an individual’s location, read pri-
vately, and sent quickly and widely. Thus, while politicians still
have means to devise alternative messages, they may have more
difficulty controlling and directly countering information about
corruption transmitted before elections through SMS compared
with newspapers, television, and radio, in which dissemination is
public and less targeted.
To examine the effects of budget information conveyed by text
messages on electoral accountability, we conducted a large ran-
domized controlled trial (n = 16,083) around Uganda’s February
2016 district elections. We transformed data on district budget
irregularities from the Uganda Office of the Auditor General
into simple notices. Then, we worked with a Ugandan non-
governmental partner, Twaweza, to send the information via
texts immediately before the elections. We treated and mea-
sured self-reported voting at the individual level, so we are able
to account for voters’ prior beliefs and voting intentions in our
analysis. This study formed a part of a seven-study initiative and
meta-analysis on information and vote choice called Metaketa I,
which informed our design (9).
Uganda was an appropriate research site. Its elections are
not free and fair, and public corruption is perceived to be
high (16). Even in autocracies, scholars have hypothesized that
better information can promote accountability (17, 18). Yet
increased transparency does not always yield positive effects
in such settings. One study in Zimbabwe found that better
informed voters were less likely to participate in politics (19).
Another study in Uganda found that disclosing information
about the performance of legislators did not affect voters’ choices
at the polls, potentially because of officials’ ability to spin public
disclosures (13).
In our experiment, informing citizens that budget irregulari-
ties in their district were worse than expected decreased reported
votes for incumbent parties’ candidates for district councillor,
whereas informing them that irregularities were fewer than
expected increased reported votes for incumbent councillors.
However, the messages did not significantly affect reported votes
for district chairs. While these heterogeneous findings were not
expected, we conjecture that the null results for district chairs
stem from citizens already having more information about these
Significance
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higher level officials and thus being more likely to take factors
beyond budget performance into account.
This study tests the potential of text messages by mobile
phone to enhance electoral accountability, reinforcing some
prior positive findings using conventional media in established
democracies (4, 20) but contrasting with other results (7, 9,
13). This study demonstrates a mixed accountability response to
texts about corruption, with the findings on councillors indicat-
ing that better informed voters hold some politicians accountable
for budgets.
Research Design
Setting. Similar to many developing countries, Uganda holds
elections that are not free and fair and suffers from corrup-
tion and poor governance, especially locally (21, 22). Although
there is competition, the electoral playing field favors the rul-
ing National Resistance Movement (NRM) party. Moreover, the
NRM restricts what media can report, particularly around elec-
tions (ref. 22, pp. 96–101). This setting creates severe challenges
for electoral accountability.
We focus on council elections for district offices, analogous
to provinces or states in other countries. District councils (also
known as LC Vs or LC5) are comprised of chairs and directly
elected councillors that represent smaller constituencies. In our
sample, 85% of elections for district chairs were contested,
though the NRM won 77% of these elections.
District councils have primary responsibility for local public
services such as health, roads, and education. They write legisla-
tion, monitor contracts, supervise public-service staff, formulate
local development programs, and plan and oversee public bud-
gets (23, 24). Chairs have significant responsibilities in these
areas in both law and practice. However, when citizens observe
shoddy services and mismanaged funds, councillors are often a
first point of contact (23, 25). According to one study, two-thirds
of councillors believe their efforts at monitoring public services
and spending affect public-service quality (24). Yet the influ-
ence of bureaucrats and higher level officials clearly constrains
councillors’ ability to manage budgets (26).
Many Ugandans lack knowledge about district councils, which
further hinders their ability to hold local officials accountable
(ref. 27, p. 16). This dynamic contributes to what the Ugandan
Auditor General has called poor local government performance
(ref. 28, pp. 13–14). In our sample, 47% of subjects said they
would be “not surprised” or “not too surprised” to learn about
corruption in their district. Scandals of financial fraud have fre-
quently implicated both chairs and councillors. We thus hypoth-
esized that budget information delivered privately on mobile
phones could help overcome more systemic barriers to gaining
information about politicians’ performance.
Experimental Treatment. District councils must submit to an
annual audit by the internationally respected Ugandan Auditor
General. The audit tracks whether councils followed procure-
ment rules, completed projects as specified, and accounted for
expenditures properly. The Auditor General presents its reports
to parliament and posts them online. However, the reports
are not widely known to the public or discussed. Respondents
indicated limited knowledge of their contents; less than 25%
correctly ranked their council’s budget performance.
We used the audits to create district ratings for fraud and mis-
management. This information was salient: More than 80% of
respondents in our sample indicated that good budget manage-
ment was important in deciding how to vote for district officials.
We made the audit information more accessible and meaning-
ful by simplifying it and adding comparisons. For example, we
explained how the percentage of unaccounted-for funds in a citi-
zen’s district compared with other districts. Additionally, to make
the information more tangible, we sent two messages with local
examples of budget performance that aligned with the treatment.
Examples messages sent to treated subjects in a “much worse”
district on day 2 of the experiment are
i) In your LC5, the auditor found issues with 120 million UGX
from its budget of 19 billion UGX. This is much worse than
in other districts.
ii) This means that 6.3 out of 1,000 UGX in your LC5 budget
had issues. In most LC5s, 2.2 out of 1,000 UGX had issues.
Your LC5 did much worse than average.
iii) One reason your LC5 did much worse than average is
that a bid for borehole construction included unexplained
expenditures.
Subjects not assigned to the treatment received placebo mes-
sages about the value of good personal financial management.
This placebo design helped us isolate the effect of novel informa-
tion from any increased salience of budgeting. Providing useful
placebo information also helped avoid unequal attrition across
conditions (see SI Appendix, Tables S8 and S9). Examples mes-
sages sent to control subjects in a “much worse” district on day 2
of the experiment are
i) Research suggests that households which open a savings
account are better able to save for school books and fees.
ii) When youth learn to save and manage their money well, they
often have higher savings and income later on in life.
Additional examples and screenshots are provided in SI Appen-
dix, Fig. S1 and Table S1.
The study was logistically complex, nationally representative,
and a significant increase in scale from most prior studies on
information and accountability. Just before district elections, we
sent a total of 207,940 text messages in 11 languages to 16,083
subjects in 762 villages dispersed among 27 districts. Because
both chairs and councillors share budget-management respon-
sibilities, the texts appeared relevant for voter evaluations.∗
To understand subjects’ experiences with the text messages,
we designed an additional survey and recontacted a random
sample of 100 treated respondents after end line. Eighty-
seven percent remembered receiving the texts, of whom 64%
reported reading them fully and 33% in part. Seventy-four per-
cent found them easy to understand and distinguish from other
messages.
Voters may be more politically engaged when they are able to
coordinate within social networks (29, 30). As a second experi-
mental treatment, we therefore varied treatment density at 80%
and 20% between village-pair blocks with at least 15 subjects.
In the high-density condition, we also informed voters that many
others in their village had received the treatment. We expected to
observe stronger treatment effects and evidence of information
sharing in the high-density condition.
Sample. We used a nationally representative sample of 27 out of
111 district councils, selected for a concurrent education audit
by Twaweza. Within each sampled district, Twaweza chose 30
villages randomly in proportion to population, except Kampala,
where 60 villages were chosen to account for greater population.
In 762 accessible sample villages, enumerators recruited 31,310
individuals using gatherings and door-to-door visits. Recruit-
ment involved substantial on-the-ground effort, since preexisting
contact lists were unavailable. We were able to recontact 16,083
subjects via phone to confirm participation and administer a
baseline survey. These subjects formed our experimental sample.
∗A concurrent, fully crossed treatment probed the effects of public-service quality. No
interaction effect occurred between crossed treatments, as discussed in SI Appendix,
Pre-Registration.
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SI Appendix contains a detailed description of sampling proce-
dures, reasons for exclusion, a CONSORT diagram (SI Appendix,
Fig. S3), a map of the sample (SI Appendix, Fig. S2), and sub-
jects’ characteristics (SI Appendix, Tables S6 and S7 and Figs. S10
and S11).
We used the 2015 Afrobarometer survey to compare our
experimental sample to the Ugandan population. In both sam-
ples, the median age was 33. However, our recruitment of
people with mobile phones skewed the sample toward men
and better educated individuals (31). If well-educated subjects
are also more politically sophisticated, it may be more difficult
to change their minds and our treatment effects may reflect
lower bounds on population effects. However, better educated
subjects might more easily understand new information, imply-
ing that these effects might not scale fully to voters without
mobile phones.
Outcome of Interest. We measure vote choice using answers to
questions from an endline survey. Self-reported voting measures
may introduce biases, such as those related to social desirability
and strategic misrepresentation. To combat such biases, previ-
ous studies have randomly assigned interventions at the level of
precincts and measured aggregate support for given candidates
using official returns (e.g., ref. 3).
We instead used a postelection survey for multiple rea-
sons. First, given ethical considerations, we wished to avoid
affecting election outcomes. Thus, we treated at a low den-
sity within constituencies, preventing the detection of effects
in aggregate returns. Second, we valued the ability to account
for individual characteristics like priors in our analysis, and
this aligns with the goals of the Metaketa I initiative of which
this study was a part (9). Third, studying aggregate-level out-
comes necessitates cluster-randomized designs, which would
dramatically decrease statistical power to identify the rela-
tively small anticipated effects. Fourth, reports indicated that
precinct-level results for district offices might not be released
or might be unreliable. Fifth, survey-based data are often
used to study vote choice in both experimental and observa-
tional studies (32, 33). Nevertheless, relying on reported vote
choice introduced the possibility that subjects did not truth-
fully report behavior. Although the results from our endline
survey correlate well with the official returns (see SI Appendix,
Fig. S5), we used multiple approaches to detect possible
misreporting.
First, we asked respondents about the basin color in their
polling station and checked for internal consistency of re-
sponses.† Second, due to social desirability, respondents may
have overreported voting for incumbents who performed well
on budgets and underreported voting for incumbents who per-
formed poorly. Yet this possibility is inconsistent with our finding
that information affected reported votes for councillors but not
for chairs. Moreover, under the reasonable assumption that the
treatment and placebo groups were equally likely to overreport
votes for the ruling party, this dynamic would not have altered
estimated effects. Our check for reporting bias toward the elec-
tion winner did not show any differences between responses
conducted before and after the release of official results (SI
Appendix, Fig. S4). Additional checks show that reported vote
choice is not conditional on perceptions of our partner (SI
Appendix, Table S2) or expectations about privacy (SI Appendix,
Table S3).
†Seventy-seven percent of responses were consistent with the modal color selected by
respondents in a village. The nonmodal answers may also happen due to difference in
polling station assignment or the presence of multiple basins. The percentage correct
does not vary meaningfully between treatment and control, or between good and bad
news-eligible subjects (SI Appendix, Fig. S6).
Findings
Turnout. The treatment could have influenced which citizens
reported voting (3, 11), so we first consider how information
affected reported turnout. The treatment had no detectable aver-
age effect on turnout (SI Appendix, Table S10). We further show
that treatment effects reported below on votes for the incumbent
are robust to including a lack of turnout as a nonpositive outcome
(SI Appendix, Table S11). Further explanation is in SI Appendix,
Turnout and Estimates of Vote Choice.
Vote Choice. We expected that when citizens received good (bad)
news about politician performance, they would be more (less)
likely to vote for incumbents. Like other Metaketa I studies (9),
we examine the effects of receiving good news and bad news
separately. The subsets of subjects are defined by whether the
information that voters were eligible to receive was better or
worse than what they believed at baseline or, if the budget infor-
mation matched their pretreatment beliefs, whether it was above
or below the median district performance (see SI Appendix,
Table S5 for analysis without priors). A detailed accounting of
the match between this analysis and our preanalysis plan is in SI
Appendix, Pre-Registration.
Fig. 1 displays the core results on reported vote choice and
confidence intervals on the estimated treatment effects among
subjects who reported turning out and who voted in elections
without party switching or redistricting. This is to minimize ambi-
guities to the definition of incumbency (see SI Appendix, Tables
S18–S21 for robustness).
For subjects eligible for good news, treated subjects were
no more likely to report voting for the incumbent chair than
placebo subjects. In contrast, treated subjects were ∼3% points
more likely to report voting for the incumbent councillor than
the placebo subjects.‡ Likewise in the other direction, treated
subjects eligible for bad news were not less likely to report vot-
ing for the incumbent chair, but they were around 3% points
less likely to report voting for the incumbent councillor. In
an augmented analysis, we find the effects were larger among
verified respondents—subjects who said that they had seen
our messages—and in the range of 5–6% points. SI Appendix,
Tables S12 and S13 show the treatment effect by party and
voter–incumbent alignment.
Information might not have affected votes for chairs because
they represent larger constituencies and, unlike councillors,
are not the primary contacts for constituents. Incentives for
performance-based voting are often greatest in small constituen-
cies because voters can more easily coordinate (2). Councillors’
smaller constituencies and their role as primary contacts at the
district level might be the reason why citizens hold councillors
responsible for budget management, despite chairs’ greater role
in principle. Thus, our findings on citizens’ reward or punish-
ment of councillors are consistent with literature on attribution
in consolidated democracies (34, 35).
Additionally, elections for chair involve higher profile cam-
paigns that disseminate information via rallies, flyers, and public
media. Indeed, independent audits assess chairs as communi-
cating better with their constituents than councillors (25). This
dynamic could decrease voters’ likelihood of reacting to new
budget information and increase chairs’ ability to diffuse respon-
sibility for budget mismanagement. Also, chairs evince more
stable tenure, perhaps due to increased resources for vote buy-
ing. Voters may thus feel less able to impact chairs’ elections and
be more likely to rely on ethnicity or party as a coordination
‡Estimates for good news attenuate to 2.3% points under a weighted estimator that
accounts for potential heterogeneity in treatment effects across randomization blocks
(SI Appendix, Table S25). Across robustness checks, there is more uncertainty about
good news estimates than bad news estimates.
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Fig. 1. Treatment effects of budget disclosures by news type. The figure dis-
plays estimated treatment effects for all subjects and for respondents who
reported seeing messages in the endline survey. Subgroup sample sizes and
control group means are printed at right. All estimates exclude uncontested
elections, elections with party-switching incumbents, and redistricted con-
stituencies. Thick and thin bars show 90% and 95% confidence intervals,
respectively. Full results are in SI Appendix, Tables S14 and S15.
device. Our treatments may therefore have been too weak to
overcome barriers to coordination or to compete with other
sources of information in the chairs’ campaigns.
Treatment Density. We expected larger treatment effects among
those in high-density villages compared with low-density villages.
Yet as Fig. 2 shows, we did not find evidence inconsistent with
the null hypothesis for treatment density.
There is, however, some evidence of information spillover.
Table 1 shows the crossed impacts of the density treatment and
the budget information treatment combined into one indicator
with four levels. The baseline condition is a placebo subject in
a low-density village. For placebo subjects in high-density vil-
lages, there is some evidence of negative spillover in the bad news
condition, since they are less likely to vote for the incumbent
than placebo subjects in the corresponding low-density villages.
The treatment effects of bad news are similarly sized within low-
and high-density subgroups. Given the indications of spillover to
the placebo subjects, these results indicate that a 9% reduction
in votes for the incumbent is the upper bound on the treat-
ment effect of bad news disseminated at high density. These
results provide some support for our hypothesis that higher treat-
ment density encourages communication and coordination. The
good news subgroup, however, does not yield results that are
inconsistent with the null hypothesis.
The mixed effects of encouraging common knowledge to over-
come coordination problems are largely consistent with the find-
ings of related experiments. An experiment in Kenya showed that
privately disseminated information about children’s education
outcomes did not affect parents’ private or public actions, and
the researchers hypothesized that publicly disseminated infor-
mation would have also yielded null effects unless it raised
expectations of collective action (7). Another study found an
impact of information on vote choice only when many oth-
ers were receiving the same information and when voters were
provided civic education messages (36).
Discussion
Political accountability depends on voters’ gaining and respond-
ing to information about the performance of elected officials.
Our findings suggest that factual information about budget man-
agement increased voter support for councillors when perfor-
mance was above expectations and decreased support for coun-
cillors when performance was below expectations but had no
effects for chairs inconsistent with the null hypothesis. Our mixed
results partly contrast with related studies that have found null
or even negative effects of information, including the Metaketa
initiative of which this study formed a part (7, 9, 11–14, 37). The
results also contrast with a parallel, factorial intervention focused
on information regarding road, water, education, and health ser-
vices at the village level for subcounty elections, which evinced
null results on vote choice—perhaps indicating the challenges of
attribution for local services (38). The predicted, positive effects
of budget information on vote choice for district councillors may
reflect the combined influence of private SMS texts with news on
corruption and high statistical power.
While we intentionally treated at low density to avoid chang-
ing electoral outcomes, we estimate that between 16 and 39 out
of 890 contested LC5 councillor elections could have flipped
in a hypothetical scenario in which all voters were treated
with information and assuming homogeneous treatment effects
(see SI Appendix, Figs. S12 and S13). Although the infor-
mation environment is continually changing, access to factual
information on budgets by SMS text that politicians could not
directly counter promoted electoral accountability for some local
offices.
However, we did not find that voters responded to new infor-
mation when voting for chairs. This unexpected result may indi-
cate that information on corruption is less effective at promoting
accountability in higher profile elections, possibly because there
is more information available or because factors like ethnicity or
party identification are more salient. In keeping with this intu-
ition, some of the most promising findings about information
campaigns come from more local elections (2, 5), whereas the
Fig. 2. The treatment effect of higher treatment density among treated
subjects. The figure displays estimated treatment effects of being assigned
to a high-density village among treated subjects. Subgroup sample sizes and
control group mean are printed at right. All estimates exclude uncontested
elections, elections with party-switching incumbents, and redistricted con-
stituencies. Thick and thin bars show 90% and 95% confidence intervals,
respectively. Full results are in Table 1.
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Table 1. Effects of budget treatment and treatment density
Good news Bad news
LC5 Chair LC5 Councillor LC5 Chair LC5 Councillor
Condition (1) (2) (3) (4)
Treated, low
density (RI) 0.023 0.012 −0.027 −0.054
(0.026) (0.030) (0.025) (0.028)
P = 0.182 P = 0.351 P = 0.141 P = 0.027
Control, high
density (RI) 0.004 −0.028 −0.034 −0.044
(0.029) (0.050) (0.029) (0.055)
P = 0.450 P = 0.718 P = 0.124 P = 0.208
Treated, high
density (RI) −0.010 −0.020 −0.028 −0.091
(0.021) (0.045) (0.021) (0.050)
P = 0.691 P = 0.669 P = 0.091 P = 0.035
Paired village
fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,281 2,585 2,633 2,391
Adjusted R2 0.211 0.244 0.286 0.264
Dependent variable: Vote choice for the incumbent. Standard errors were
derived from randomization inference (RI). One-tailed tests were performed
in the direction of the hypothesized relationship. Sample only includes
subjects eligible for the density treatment (≥ 15 respondents per village).
Statistical models are numbered 1–4 as indicated in column headings.
effects of information campaigns for higher level offices even in
Uganda have been disappointing (13).
Future work could examine information campaigns across dif-
ferent levels of elections and vary the amount of information
voters must process. Our hypothesis about information satura-
tion could be directly tested by mixing treatment information
with additional information that is either relevant or irrelevant
for electoral accountability. A further possibility is that informa-
tion campaigns should be accompanied by civic education that
emphasizes the importance of programmatic voting and clarifies
politicians’ responsibilities (36).
Finally, we note that despite our use of mobile technology, sub-
jects were engaged in our study. We had uptake and treatment
effects similar to those associated with more traditional methods
of information dissemination, such as public-service broadcasts,
leaflets, or door-to-door canvassing as cited above. Yet assem-
bling and disseminating information via text messaging is simpler
and cheaper for the many civil society organizations—such as
Twaweza—that have already collected such contact information
as part of their programing. Thus, the costs of information cam-
paigns such as the one in our study might reasonably be borne by
community-based groups in the future (see SI Appendix, Table
S22 for examples). These opportunities will increase as more
people own mobile phones.
Materials and Methods
Measurement. Local enumerators conducted baseline and endline phone
surveys. The baseline survey occurred in early January 2016, before treat-
ment assignment. Enumerators collected information about subjects’ demo-
graphics, partisanship, prior voting, intended participation in the elections,
political knowledge, interest in budget information, and beliefs about
incumbents’ performance.
To measure priors, we asked respondents at baseline to compare their
LC5’s record of managing its budget expenditures and contracting to other
districts in Uganda. Using these priors, we divided respondents into good
and bad news subgroups based upon whether their priors were more pos-
itive or negative than the true value from the council audit. For instance,
if a respondent believed that his or her council was doing “better” than
other councils but the council had in fact done worse than others in the
audit, then the respondent would be in the bad-news subgroup. We provide
more details on the coding of priors in SI Appendix, show the distribution
of prior and true values in SI Appendix, Figs. S7–S9, and display robustness
of estimates to unsure priors in SI Appendix, Table S4.
We conducted an endline survey immediately following the district elec-
tions. We were able to recontact more than 80% of the experimental
sample at endline, with attrition balanced across experimental groups (see
SI Appendix, Tables S8 and S9 and Fig. S11). Approximately 10% of the end-
line surveys were completed before the election results were announced,
with subjects contacted in a random order.
Defining incumbency was complicated because 19% of chairs and 30%
of councillors in our sample switched parties, which was unanticipated in
our preanalysis plan. In many cases, party switchers had lost a primary
and ran as independents, raising the question of whether the candidate or
party should be considered the incumbent. In the main results, we exclude
elections where the incumbent switched parties and ran for re-election,
which seemed the most reasonable adjustment best aligned with prespec-
ified theoretical goals. SI Appendix shows different effects of treatment
for party-switching incumbents (SI Appendix, Table S18). We explore the
implications of different exclusion criteria and incumbency definitions in
further analyses: (1) the subset of constituencies where incumbents ran
as a member of their party from the 2011 elections (SI Appendix, Table
S19); (2) all observations, with incumbency defined as the party elected
to the relevant office in 2011 (SI Appendix, Table S20); and (3) all obser-
vations, with incumbency defined as the potentially updated party of all
individuals who ran for re-election in 2016 (SI Appendix, Table S21). Treat-
ment effects for good news are larger for (1) and (2) and smaller for (3),
while treatment effects attenuate slightly for bad news with all alternative
definitions of incumbency. Inconsistency with the null hypothesis varies by
specification.
Treatment Density. Within each district, villages were partitioned into those
that had at least 15 subjects and those that did not. For villages with at least
15 subjects, we created paired blocks of villages with similar numbers of
subjects. Within each block, we assigned one village to have 80% of subjects
treated and the other to have 20% of subjects treated. In villages where
80% of subjects were treated, the messages also informed subjects that “we
are going to be sending you and many of your neighbors information.”
Estimation. Information can represent either good or bad news depend-
ing on respondents’ prior beliefs. Thus, as preregistered and coordinated
in Metaketa I, we split our sample into two subsets for analysis defined by
whether individuals were eligible to receive good or bad news. We define
Pi as each subject i’s pretreatment belief about the quality of the incum-
bent candidate j, where the true value is Qj . Additionally, we define Q̂
as the median value of quality for incumbents in all other districts k. We
then define the subset of subjects eligible for good news (L+) as all subjects
where Pi <Qj or where Pi =Qj and Qj ≥ Q̂. We define the subset of subjects
eligible for bad news (L−) as all subjects where Pi >Qj or where Pi =Qj and
Qj < Q̂.
To estimate the effect of good news, we collapse all types of good news
into a single treatment indicator T+i , which equals 1 when the subject i is
treated and is part of the relevant subset L+. For example, the good news
subgroup includes subjects who thought budget discrepancies were much
worse than average at baseline but were eligible to receive information
that they were only “a little worse.” Likewise, we collapse all types of bad
news into an indicator that equals 1 when subject i is treated and part of
the subset L−.
Our primary estimating equation is Eq. 1, which in this case is notated for
the good news subgroup. In it yij,t=1 indicates whether the subject voted
for the incumbent party for the political office j; yij,t=0, indicates whether
the subject stated that he or she intended to vote for the incumbent party
during the baseline survey; β is a vector of estimated coefficients; Zi is a
matrix of prespecified, pretreatment covariates; νj is a village fixed effect;
and jh is the error term clustered by politician (j).
yij,t=1 =α+ τ1T
+
ik +ϕyij,t=0 +βZi + νj + j. [1]
To estimate the conditional effect of the good news and bad news treat-
ments based on treatment density, we use the modified estimating equation
in Eq. 2, which includes a density treatment indicator Dj assigned at the vil-
lage level. Because the density treatment is assigned at the village level,
we use a paired-village fixed effect bj for blocks to mirror our assignment
strategy:
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yij,t=1 =α+ τ1T
+
ik + τ2Dj + τ3T
+
ik Dj +ϕyij,t=0 +βZi + bj + j. [2]
By using the pretreatment intention measure as a predictor variable, we
deviate slightly from our preregistered equations. In the prespecified strat-
egy, we use the difference between intended and realized voting outcomes
as the dependent variable. The results from that strategy are nearly the
same (see SI Appendix, Tables S16 and S17). All standard errors for treat-
ment effects in the main text are standard deviations of the randomization
distribution created by assuming a sharp null hypothesis and recording
values that would have been realized under 10,000 iterations of random
assignment. All p values are one-sided in the direction of the hypothe-
sized relationship. The adjusted models include the following preregistered
covariates: perception of living conditions, gender, education, age, trust
in information from Twaweza, perception that powerful people will learn
about vote choice, perception that vote counting will be fair, and voted for
incumbent in 2011. Additional analyses in SI Appendix cover manipulation
checks (SI Appendix, Fig. S14 and Table S23); multiple, joint, and pooled
testing (SI Appendix, Table S24); and fixed-effects weights (SI Appendix,
Table S25).
Data and Preanalysis Plan. Buntaine’s Dataverse page provides replication
data and code. Preregistration materials filed with Evidence in Governance
and Politics (EGAP, 20151119AA) include an initial plan before baseline, a
revised plan before treatment, and an amendment before analysis.
This project was approved by the University of California, Santa Barbara
(UCSB) Human Subjects Committee (15-0690); institutional review boards
(IRBs) at Brigham Young University (15381), William and Mary (2015-09-10-
10589), and Temple (via IRB Authorization Agreement); the London School
of Economics and Political Science Research Ethics Committee; the Uganda
Mildmay Research Ethics Committee (0309-2015); the Uganda National
Council for Science and Technology (SS 3943); and the Ugandan Office of
the President (ADM 154/212/03).
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